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I. Introduction
The rights of artists in their works have long been regarded
in Europe as involving pecuniary as well as personal interests.1
The former include exploitative rights in the work generally cov-
ered by the copyright laws, such as monopoly over reproduction,
adaptation, and performance for a term of years.2 The latter are
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1. Note, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artists, Authors and
Creators, 53 HARv. L. REv. 554 (1940); see also Kury, Protection for Creators in the
United States and Abroad, 13 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 1 (1963); DaSilva, Droit
Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists' Rights in France and the
United States, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 1 (1980).
2. Note, An Artist's Personal Rights in His Creative Works: Beyond the Human
Cannonball and the Flying Circus, 9 PAC. L.J. 855, 856 (1978).
1
PACE LAW REVIEW
concerned with the work of art, not strictly as an item of com-
merce, but as an expression of the artist's personality.'
When an artist creates, be he an author, a painter, a sculptor, an
architect or a musician, he does more than bring into the world a
unique object having only exploitive possibilities; he projects into
the world part of his personality and subjects it to the ravages of
public use. There are possibilities of injury to the creator other
than merely economic ones; these the copyright statute do not
protect.4
This spiritual stake of the artist in his creations has re-
ceived the highest degree of legal recognition in France,5 where
the bundle of rights developed to protect creative personality in-
terests is known as droit moral, or moral right.' Four basic com-
ponents comprise the author's moral right.7 First, the right of
disclosure vests solely in the artist the right to decide when a
work should first be made public or sold.8 Second is the right to
withdraw or modify a work which is no longer representative of
the creator's persona. The third component is the right to pater-
nity, under which are subsumed the right to be credited as the
author of one's own work or to remain anonymous or pseudony-
mous, the right to prevent false attribution of one's work to
someone else, and the right to disclaim authorship of work not
one's own. Finally, the right of integrity, or respect for the work,
protects against mutilation, modification, or complete destruc-
tion of the work. Under French law, at least in theory, the artist
cannot effectively waive these rights,9 even by express contrac-
tual provision, 0 and their enforcement survives the life of the
3. Note, supra note 1, at 556.
4. Id. at 557.
5. Diamond, Legal Protection for the "Moral Rights" of Authors and Other Cre-
ators, 68 TRADEMARK REP. 244, 249 (1978).
6. UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (1984) (translating Loi
Sur La Proprit6 Litthraire Artistique L. No. 57-298, Art. 1 (1957)) [hereinafter Law of
1957].
7. See Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral Right of Authors and Artists Under
French Law, 16 AM. J. CoMP. L. 465, 467 (1968).
8. For details on these rights, see infra notes 115-263 and accompanying text.
9. See DaSilva, supra note 1, at 16.
10. Id. at 27 (citing Judgment of Nov. 15, 1966, Cours d'appel, Paris 1967 Gazette du
Palais [G.P.] 1.17); see generally Sarraute, supra note 7.
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artist and continues in perpetuity."1
In rendering the moral right inalienable and perpetual,
French law interpolates the rights of artistic personality into the
interests of society in preserving art as part of the nation's cul-
tural heritage. 12 Thus, rights vesting in the artist by virtue of his
creative self-expression are subtly shifted, by theoretical osmo-
sis, into the work itself, rendering it an inviolable repository of
the collective interest in the preservation of art.
Although the French approach is extremely deferential to
and protective of art and artists,"3 its subordination of property
rights to the artist's moral rights has engendered numerous
practical difficulties in application. " In this respect, the droit
moral is fundamentally different from the approach found in
American law, which has traditionally focused more attention on
proprietary rights than upon the protection of the personal
interests of artists in their creations or of the works of art
themselves. 5
American law does not recognize "moral" rights of artists. 6
Historically, the common law has treated works of art in the
same manner as other forms of property, and through copyright
legislation has duly protected the artist's control over first publi-
cation, reproduction, and adaptation. At common law, however,
for an artist working under commission, there was a presump-
tion of the employer's ownership of the copyright. An artist
could retain his right only by reserving it pursuant to contract.'7
In the United States, artists seeking to vindicate their "moral"
interests have had relatively little success. 8 Without a unified
moral rights theory upon which to rely, these plaintiffs have en-
11. Law of 1957, supra note 6, art. 6-7, cl. 2. The right is inheritable. Id.
12. See Diamond, supra note 5, at 249; see also Merryman, The Refrigerator of
Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023, 1041 (1976).
13. See DaSilva, supra note 1, at 2.
14. Id. at 7, 17-37; see generally Note, Artworks and American Law: The California
Art Preservation Act, 61 B.U.L. REv. 1201 (1981).
15. Merryman, supra note 12, at 1037.
16. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976); see also
Maslow, Droit Moral and Sections 43(a) and 44(i) of the Lanham Act - A Judicial
Shell Game?, 48 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 377 (1980).
17. Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309
U.S. 686 (1940).
18. See Diamond, supra note 5, at 252.
1989]
3
PACE LAW REVIEW
listed the aid of various common-law theories, including breach
of contract, unfair competition, defamation, the right to privacy,
and the right to publicity, as well as the statutory protection af-
forded under copyright and trademark laws. 19 Some commenta-
tors regard these alternatives as functionally equivalent to safe-
guards in a moral rights system, at least to the extent that such
measures are compatible with traditional Anglo-American no-
tions of property and contract.20 There is no compelling neces-
sity, under this view, to advocate the "transplanting" of French
moral rights theory into the American legal landscape.
Moreover, there are fundamental differences in the concep-
tual origins and development of artists' rights in France and in
the United States, reflecting divergent attitudes toward the sta-
tus of artists in society and the source and nature of their rights.
Because of established legal culture and traditions, among other
reasons,2 1 wholesale adoption of moral rights doctrine is likely to
be unacceptable in the United States, and might be inappropri-
ate as well.
On the other hand, moral rights advocates contend that a
reconceptualization of the role of art and artists in American so-
ciety is long overdue.2 Works of art, whether literary, visual,
dramatic, or musical, should be recognized, not merely as "prop-
erty" to be exploited, but as incarnations of creative thought.
The artist's interest in protecting the integrity of his work, as
well as society's interest in preserving its cultural legacy, must
be more fully addressed in our law. The current trend of activ-
ism in the area of artists' rights appears to be animated by an
interesting coalescence of both viewpoints. In the judicial arena,
the barriers to recognition of some moral rights are slowly erod-
ing. Courts have interpreted expansively section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act, 3 the federal trademarks statute, to proscribe the
public display of a work attributed to its creator after that work
19. Id. at 259-71.
20. Giesel v. Poynter Products, Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 340 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Note,
supra note 2, at 877.
21. See generally infra notes 115-130 and accompanying text.
22. See Merryman, supra note 12, at 1049; see also Taubman, The New York Art-
ists' Authorship Rights Act of 1983: Waiver and Fair Use, 3 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J.
113, 123 (1984).
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982).
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has been significantly altered without the artist's consent.",
Two state legislatures have recently exercised their appar-
ent discretion to enact what have been called "moral rights stat-
utes." In 1980, California enacted the Art Preservation Act, 5
and in 1983, New York passed its Artists' Authorship Rights
Act.2 6 As the titles indicate, California's law focuses more on
preserving art for posterity, while New York's Act centers on
safeguarding the artist's reputation.
Following an analysis of the historical evolution of artists'
rights in France and the United States, we will discuss these re-
cent legislative developments. We will then offer some proposals
for an approach to this problem that we believe address the
principal concerns of artists and of those who purchase the
works that they create.
II. The Rights of Artists in France
The modern French doctrine of artists' moral rights is
philosophically rooted in the turbulent social and political mi-
lieu of the late eighteenth century. Before the French Revolu-
tion, the sovereign retained plenary power over all intellectual
rights, and generally conferred such rights only upon printers.2
The right granted was actually limited to a monopoly over re-
production for a fixed period. 8 In the years immediately preced-
ing the Revolution, the inherent interest of an author in his un-
published manuscript was recognized as emanating from the
creative act itself, rather than from any royal prerogative. 9
This concept later served as a banner of revolutionary fer-
vor. Any taint of Crown sovereignty was purged from the rights
of authors. Artistic creation was considered a noble exercise of
individual liberty.3 0 Thus, the personal rights of an artist in his
creations were infused at their inception with the sanctity of
24. Sokolow, A New Weapon for Artists' Rights: Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Trademark Act, 5 ART & ThE LAW 32 (1980).
25. CAL. CiV. CODE § 987 (West Supp. 1985).
26. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1988) (original
version at §§ 14.51-.59 (McKinney 1983)).
27. DaSilva, supra note 1, at 8.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 8-9.
30. Id.
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natural law. It is not surprising, therefore, that this reverence for
the personality of the artist, as it developed in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries, was termed droit moral.1 Nor is it dif-
ficult to comprehend why, in France, moral rights are considered
wholly distinct from any proprietary interest in the objet d'art.2
The Law of 19573 provides a lengthy list of intellectual works
that are covered.3 4 Article 2 of the law provides that all intellec-
tual works, "regardless of their kind, form of expression, merit
or purpose, ' '3 5 are entitled to protection. Protection is also avail-
able for authors and editors of derivative works, including
anthologies, compilations, and other variations on existing intel-
lectual works. "[T]ranslations, adaptations, new versions, or ar-
rangements of intellectual works shall enjoy the protection pro-
vided by this law without prejudice to the rights of the author of
the original work."3 Derivative works may similarly be copy-
righted in the American system, as long as the material taken
from the original work is used lawfully.3 7
The most notable feature of the French copyright law is the
scope of moral rights granted to the author. Under Article 6 of
the Law of 1957, "[tlhe author shall enjoy the right to respect
for his name, his authorship, and his work. This right shall be
attached to his person. It shall be perpetual, inalienable and im-
31. See id. at 7.
32. Id. at 10.
33. See Law of 1957, supra note 6. This statute was amended by the Law on Au-
thors' Rights and on the Rights of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Vide-
ograms and Audiovisual Communication Enterprises. Law No. 85-660 (1985).
34. See Law of 1957, supra note 6, at art. 3. Included in the 1957 definition of intel-
lectual works are:
books, pamphlets, and other literary, artistic and scientific writings; lectures, ad-
dresses, sermons, pleadings in court, and other works of the same nature; dramatic
or dramatico-musical works; choreographic works, and pantomimes, the acting
form of which is fixed in writing or otherwise; musical compositions with or with-
out words; cinematographic works and works made by processes analogous to cine-
matography; works of drawing, painting, architecture, sculpture, engraving, lithog-
raphy; photographic works of an artistic or documentary character, and other
works of the same character produced by processes analogous to photography;
works of applied art; illustrations, geographical maps; plans, sketches, and plastic
works, relative to geography, topography, architecture, or the sciences.
Id.
35. Id. art. 2.
36. Id. art. 4.
37. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1982).
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prescriptable. It may be transmitted mortis causa to the heirs of
the author. ... 38 Collaborative works, i.e., works created by
more than one person, are the joint property of the authors, 9
and are distinguished from "composite works," in which preex-
isting works are incorporated into a new work without the col-
laboration of the original author.'0 Composite works are the
property of the "realizing" author without prejudice to the
rights of the author of the preexisting work.'1 A "collective
work," in which the personal contributions of the various cre-
ators are so merged as to make it impossible to attribute to each
author a separate right in the work, is generally deemed the
work of the person or legal entity under whose name it is dis-
closed.' 2 In 1985, the law's coverage was extended to works made
for hire and multiple authorship. 3
In French law, as in European law generally, the protections
afforded authors under the moral rights doctrine extend to each
of these categories of artistic work and apply through the au-
thor's lifetime plus fifty years."
We have already noted that the French have encountered
some practical difficulties in applying the idealistic tenets of the
moral rights doctrine in practice.4'5 As we shall see, the French
courts have struggled to overcome these difficulties, but have not
fully succeeded in doing so.
A. The Right of Disclosure
French tribunals have consistently upheld the right of the
artist alone to determine when a work is satisfactorily completed
and ready for public view.' 6 L'Affaire Roualt17 illustrates the
difficulty of discerning when disclosure has occurred and how far
38. Law of 1957, supra note 6, at art. 6.
39. Id. art. 9.
40. Id.
41. Id. art. 12.
42. Id. arts. 9, 13.
43. Title I, art. 1(5), 1985 amendment.
44. Law of 1957, supra note 6, at art. 21.
45. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
46. See DaSilva, supra note 1, at 17-22.
47. Id. at 19 n.133 (citing Judgment of March 19, 1947, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1949
P~riodique et critique [D.P.] 20).
19891
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the courts are willing to go in deference to the artist's judgment
as to when a work is finished. The artist, Roualt, had placed
hundreds of paintings in the custody of an art dealer, who stored
them in a closet in his (the dealer's) apartment."" Roualt would
occasionally come by to apply finishing touches to the works."9
Following the art dealer's death, his heirs claimed ownership of
Roualt's paintings; but the court held for Roualt, finding that
ownership had never passed to the dealer, even though Roualt
had accepted advances from him and relinquished possession of
the paintings.50 The only remedy the court allowed the dealer's
heirs was restoration to them of the advances that Roualt had
received.51
In L'Affaire Camoin,52 the Paris Court of Appeals upheld
the right of an artist to destroy his own work and to enjoin an-
other from restoring the discarded works and selling them. This
decision raises a disturbing paradox that reveals the doctrine's
double edge: "After all, if droit moral arises from a notion that
art works somehow are more sacred than fungible property, it
would be ironic for the doctrine to justify court-ordered art-
burnings."53
Whistler v. Eden54 is a prime example of strict enforcement
of an artist's prerogatives. Lord Eden commissioned the famous
American artist to paint a portrait of Eden's wife.5 With Eden's
permission, Whistler arranged for the portrait to be displayed at
an exhibition. 6 When Whistler received Lord Eden's check in
payment of his fee, he was outraged at what he considered ex-
48. Id. at 19.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 18 n.130 (citing Judgment of March 6, 1931, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1931
Periodique et critique [D.P.] II 88).
53. Id. at 19. Indeed, French law has not adequately addressed this anomaly. Some-
what paradoxically, the theoretical concept of droit moral presupposes that the artist's
personal rights granted in perpetuity coincide with society's interest in preservation.
This may not always, in fact, be the case. For discussion, see infra notes 64-70 and ac-
companying text.
54. Id. at 18 n.126 (citing Judgment of March 20, 1898, Trib. Civ., Seine 1898 [D.P.]
II 465; Judgment of December 21, 1897, Cour d'appel, Paris; Judgment of May 14, 1900,
Cass. civ. ire 1900 [D.P.] I 5000).
55. Id. at 18.
56. Id.
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cessively low compensation but cashed the check nevertheless.5 7
When the portrait was returned to his studio from the exhibi-
tion, Whistler painted out Lady Eden's head, substituted an-
other, and refused to deliver the painting.58 Eden sued for resto-
ration of the portrait, delivery, and damages.59 The Cour de
cassation awarded Eden the purchase price and damages but
would not compel restoration. The Whistler case stands for the
proposition that the "artist is the absolute master of the deci-
sion to disclose his work, even when the right of disclosure
would seem to impair contractual obligations."' I1
Lack of inspiration is not a ground for breach of contract to
create.62 The artist must act in good faith or be held liable for
damages." Thus, although French courts are generally quite so-
licitous of the more ethereal forms of the artist's moral rights,
they nevertheless hold that the artist's discretion must, in the
interest of fairness, be limited.
B. The Right of Withdrawal or Modification
In 1911, Anatole France sought to enjoin a publisher from
printing a first edition of a manuscript France had written and
sold to the defendant twenty-five years earlier.64 France asserted
that the work no longer reflected his aesthetic orientation. 5 The
court granted the injunction but ordered France to return the
full purchase price to the publisher.6
The decision in the France case demonstrates precisely the
scope of the right of withdrawal or modification. Although in
theory an artist in France may withdraw or modify a work if it is
no longer representative of his vision, even after ownership has
been transferred, this right is limited in practical terms so as to
57. Merryman, supra note 12, at 1024.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. DaSilva, supra note 1, at 18.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 23 n.159 (citing Judgment of December 4, 1911, 1912 Pataille 1.98); Kury,
supra note 1, at 5.
65. Kury, supra note 1, at 5.
66. DaSilva, supra note 1, at 24.
1989]
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obviate the potential harm to the holders of the property inter-
ests in that work. 7 If the artist exercises the right subsequent to
sale of the work, he must indemnify the owner in advance for
any loss that the retraction or change might cause."8 There is an
attendant obligation to give the same owner a right of first re-
fusal on terms identical to those of the original contract once the
modified work is offered for sale. 9 These restrictions obviously
accommodate some of the property rights of the purchasers of
art works, but they have the reciprocal effect of imposing very
heavy costs upon the artist's invocation of his moral rights -
costs that may well be prohibitive.70
C. The Right of Paternity
The right to be credited as the author of one's own work has
been vigorously upheld in France, in part because of its close
connection with the doctrine on the natural right of individual
liberty which first ignited the fuse of revolution in France. So
strong is the resilience of this right of paternity that it has with-
stood the powerful force of contrary contractual obligations. 71 As
we shall see later, this is not so in the United States, especially
where works made for hire are concerned.72
In Guille v. Colmant,73 the Paris Court of Appeals refused
to enforce a contract requiring an artist to sign certain of his
works with a pseudonym, leaving others unsigned. 7 The court
held that such contractual provisions were void as violative of
the right of paternity.75 The court in Guille was intrigued by
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. DaSilva, supra note 1, at 27 (citing Judgment of March 15, 1967, Cour d'appel,
Paris 1967 [G.P.] 1.17); Merryman, supra note 12, at 1027 (waiver of the right of pater-
nity in France is unenforceable). Article 6 of the 1957 Law declares artists' rights to be
inalienable and unassignable. See Law of 1957, supra note 6, at art. 6. This determina-
tion has engendered considerable controversy and provoked allegations of unnecessary
paternalism. DaSilva, supra note 1, at 29.
72. See infra notes 131-143 and accompanying text.
73. DaSilva, supra note 1, at 27 (citing Judgment of March 15, 1967, Cour d'appel,
Paris 1967 [G.P.] 1.17).
74. Id.
75. Id.
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another feature of the contract as well. The business arrange-
ment between the artist and the dealer was to last for the un-
usually long period of ten years, and the dealer had the exclusive
unilateral right to terminate it.76 The court considered such an
arrangement inevitably detrimental to the artist's reputation,
because it mandated a particularly rigorous rate of artistic pro-
duction over an extended term.77 This foray into the protection
of the artist's reputation predicated on the doctrine of moral
right drew criticism for its blatant inconsistency with the philo-
sophical premises that underlie the doctrine.7 "Legal protection
is granted 'solely for the performance of the creative act' regard-
less of the artistic merit of the work produced. Thus, the work's
merit, and consequently, the author's reputation, do not enter
into account, and need not be protected. '7 9
Perhaps reputation conjures all too easily specters of pecu-
niary interest in the minds of purist droit moralistes.80 In Mar-
tin-Caille v. Bergerot,"1 the court refused to enjoin an art dealer
from "dumping" large quantities of the artist's paintings on the
market at low prices, thereby causing a serious decline in the
value of all of his works.82 Bergerot's real complaint, the court
reasoned, was against the defendant's marketing practices,
which were operating to his financial detriment."' This claim was
distinguished from a veritable moral rights claim, i.e., one
against an attack on the artist's creative personality per se. 84
76. Sarraute, supra note 7, at 479.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. (quoting Law of 1957, supra note 6, at art. 1) (citations omitted).
80. During the early development of the droit moral in France, the debate raged
over whether property principles or the idea of creative personality would prevail as the
dominant or even exclusive characterization of moral right. Support for the personal na-
ture of the right grew as the antiproperty influence of Marxist thinking spread in the
mid-nineteenth century. Nevertheless, a separate theory of intellectual property did take
root and by the twentieth century the two characterizations attained comparable vitality,
while remaining conceptually distinct. DaSilva, supra note 1, at 10-11.
81. Merryman, supra note 12, at 1031 n.23 (citing Martin-Caille v. Bergerot, Cass.
civ. ire, 1969 Dalloz-Sirey, Jurisprudence [D.S. Jur.] 73).
82. Id. at 1031.
83. Id.
84. Id. This decision illustrates a major difference between the French and American
attitudes toward reputation as a potentially protected interest. In France, reputation in
this context is considered an interest too closely related to finances, too crass to merit
moral rights protection. In the United States, the New York statute requires that injury
19891
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The second category of the right of paternity, the preven-
tion of false attribution to someone else of one's own work, is
less well defined in French case law.85 A closely analogous exam-
ple is the case of the marble cutter who signed a tombstone he
had fashioned, but which the artist did not sign.86 The court
held that the artist's authorship took precedence over that of
the marble cutter.8 7
The third category of the right of paternity, the artist's in-
terest in preventing the use of her name on works not her own,
is substantially similar to some aspects of the right of integrity.8
Under this component of the right of paternity, if an artist's
work has been altered or mutilated, the artist may disclaim au-
thorship.8 9 As a corollary to this right, artists have been permit-
ted to restrain the use of their names in advertisements."
D. The Right of Integrity
The right of integrity is regarded as the most important ele-
ment of the moral rights doctrine."' If art is understood as the
embodiment of the artist's personality, then any defacement or
unauthorized alteration of the work is an attack on the artist's
creative self.
In Fersing v. Buffet, 92 the artist, Buffet, designed a number
of panels for a refrigerator.9 3 He signed only one of the panels,
evidencing his concept of the panels as an inseparable whole. 4
The owner of the refrigerator attempted to dismantle the work
to reputation (or the reasonable likelihood of such injury) be proved in actions brought
thereunder. See infra text accompanying note 291. The California statute does not re-
quire a showing of damage to reputation but mandates that the work seeking protection
be "of recognized quality." See infra text accompanying note 270.
85. DaSilva, supra note 1, at 27.
86. Id. at 27 n.187.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 28.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 30-31.
92. Id. at 31 n.212 (citing Judgment of May 30, 1962, Cour d'appel, Paris 1962 Dal-
loz, Jurisprudence 570; Judgment of July 6, 1965, Cour de cass. 1965 [G.P.] 11 126); see
also Merryman, supra note 12, at 1023 n.1.
93. Merryman, supra note 12, at 1023.
94. Id.
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and sell the panels separately, over Buffet's protest.9 5 The Cour
de cassation upheld Buffet's moral right to insist that his work
remain intact.96
In Buffet, the court evidently concluded that the owner's
property interests were not excessively compromised by the rul-
ing that the refrigerator could not be disassembled, when con-
trasted with Buffet's personal interest in the work's integrity.97
The balance of interests, however, is not always so clear. In
Lacasse v. Abb Quenard,98 for example, an artist painted fres-
coes on the walls of a small chapel pursuant to a commission
from the town.99 The actual owner of the chapel, the bishop, had
no knowledge of the commission, and ultimately disapproved of
the frescoes and had them obliterated. 100 The artist sued and the
court found for the owner, implying that if the bishop had origi-
nally consented to the commission, the outcome might have
been different. 101
A later case involving the complete destruction of a work of
art supports this speculation. In Sudre v. Commune de
Baixas,102 the artist was commissioned to create a statue for the
fountain in his native village.108 The statue was not well main-
tained, and eventually the town council had it removed and de-
stroyed, utilizing pieces of the sculpture to fill holes in the
road.1 04 The sculptor sued and was awarded substantial damages
for violation of his right of integrity in his work.10 5
The results in Lacasse and Sudre suggest that the right of
integrity is not absolute but will prevail against an owner's prop-
erty interest if that owner gives prior consent to the work, ac-
cepts it, and later mutilates it."" In sum, whereas the modern
95. DaSilva, supra note 1, at 31.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 33 n.223 (citing Judgment of April 27, 1934, Cour d'appel, Paris 1934
[D.P.] 385).
99. Merryman, supra note 12, at 1034.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1034 n.34 (citing Sudre v. Commune de Baixas, Conseil de Prefecture,
Montpellier, 1937 Gazette du Palais [G.P.] 1 347).
103. Id. at 1034.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1034-35.
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French doctrine of droit moral has taken the lead in providing
protection for artists' personal rights in their works and the doc-
trine has retained much of its idealistic resonance, it has also
developed significant limitations in response to strong competing
interests and modern exigencies.10 7
The personal nature of moral rights has been diluted in
cases involving such collaborative works as motion pictures,
where rights are considered to be collective and must be shared
among those who collaborated in the creative effort.'0 8 Their ex-
ercise may also be subject to a rule of unanimity among joint
collaborators.' 0
Not all rights that fall under the doctrine of droit moral are
blessed with perpetual life. The rights of disclosure, paternity,
and integrity survive the artist, but the right to withdraw or
modify a work dies with him, 110 for these latter rights depend to
a greater degree upon the artist's ongoing creative powers. Once
those powers no longer exist, the rights that depend upon them
vanish as well."'
Even the precept that the artist's moral rights are inaliena-
ble does not escape limitation. In practice, certain contracts
transferring moral rights are enforced. 12 Moreover, just as each
artist in a collaborative effort relinquishes a portion of his inde-
pendent moral rights, so also the adaptation of a work from one
medium to another (e.g., the production of a film based upon a
novel or an earlier theatrical production) requires a release of
part of the right of integrity.1 3
Finally, as a practical matter, the supremacy of moral rights
over pecuniary interests, while theoretically maintained, is not
absolute. 4 Nevertheless, despite these exceptions, the French
commitment to protecting the "natural" right of artists to create
and to be free of the threat of abuse of their works remains es-
107. See generally DaSilva, supra note 1.
108. Id. at 12.
109. Id. at 13.
110. Id. at 14.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 16.
113. Id. at 34.
114. Id. at 33 (citing Judgment of April 27, 1934, Cour d'appel, Paris 1934 [D.P.]
385).
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sentially intact.
III. The Public Interest vs. The Artist's Rights: American
Law
A. English Precedents
As in France, artists' rights in England and later in the
United States trace their legal origins to the advent of the
printed word. In 1476, the first printing press opened for busi-
ness in England. 15 The Crown quickly asserted supreme author-
ity to regulate the emerging publishing industry. This authority
encompassed the power to issue printers' licenses, "letters pat-
ent,'"" 6 to establish the Court of Star Chamber,117 and to charter
the Company of Stationers,"' which enjoyed a monopoly "over
the publication of books, and held all rights in them."' 9 It is
quite clear that the purpose of all of this was to protect the
Crown, and not to confer privileges upon writers.
The Court of Star Chamber operated chiefly to suppress
what was perceived to be a dangerous outbreak of heresy."' 0 Star
Chamber regarded the Company of Stationers as a convenient
instrument with which to censor this religious dissension.' 2 ' The
Company, however, eventually developed its own policies once
Star Chamber was abolished, 2' and it became more and more
distant from the controlling influence of royal prerogative. The
Company's independent policies tended to solidify its monopoly
and left authors with virtually no rights at all. 2 3 Following the
Glorious Revolution of 1688,124 Parliament withdrew its support
115. Note, Copyright: Moral Right-A Proposal, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 793, 803
(1975).
116. Id. at 803 n.99 (letters patent grant particular rights in particular manuscripts).
117. Id. at 803-04.
118. Id.
119. DaSilva, supra note 1, at 37.
120. Note, supra note 115, at 804. The Anglican Church viewed any separatist or
Calvinist ideas as heretical.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 804-05.
124. In 1688, the British Parliament resorted to extra-constitutional measures to
overthrow the Catholic monarch, James II, in order to preserve the Protestant Church
and to protect English rights and liberties from the vagaries of arbitrary rule. Parliament
ignored the hereditary principle of succession by overlooking James' infant son as heir to
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of the Company. Suddenly willing to negotiate, the Company
loosened its tight-fisted control over intellectual and commercial
rights in published material with Parliament's passage of the
Statute of Anne, 25 the first copyright law.'26
Far from reaching the lofty heights of the natural law theo-
rists' exaltation of the personal liberty of the creative spirit, the
Statute of Anne was a pragmatic compromise between publish-
ers on the one hand, scrambling to retain any vestiges of their
dwindling power, and the authors, independent printers, and
members of Parliament on the other.'27 This is not to say that
"natural" rights of authors were readily granted or were not vig-
orously disputed in subsequent interpretations of the Statute.' 8
These disputes, however, arose from conflicting claims to ex-
ploitative power over the works. 2 9 Ultimately, the Statute of
Anne became in effect "an owner's statute, and not an author's
statute."'30
B. American Copyright Laws
This bias toward statutory protection of the proprietary
rights of the copyright holder, without extending any significant
statutory protection to the author, was adopted by the United
States Congress in 1790, with the passage of the first American
copyright act.' 3' As time passed, Congress exhibited greater so-
licitude for the rights of the author, as opposed to the copyright
holder - always, however, holding the public interest para-
mount. The legislative history of the Copyright Act of 1961, for
the throne, and invited William of Holland to lead the campaign against James and to
assume the throne. There was no civil war; James fled to France and William and Mary
jointly acceded to power. The following year, Parliament enacted a series of laws collec-
tively called the Revolution Settlement, in which the balance of power between Parlia-
ment and the Crown was readjusted to deprive the Crown of much of its former preroga-
tive. Id.
125. Id. at 805 n.112 (citing 8 Anne ch. 19 (1709)).
126. Id. at 805.
127. DaSilva, supra note 1, at 37-38.
128. Note, supra note 115, at 805-06.
129. See id. at 806.
130. DaSilva, supra note 1, at 38 (quoting Comment, Toward Artistic Integrity: Im-
plementing Moral Right Through Extension of Existing American Legal Doctrines, 60
GEo. L.J. 1539 (1972)).
131. Copyright Act, ch. 15, Stat. 124 (1790) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810
(1982)).
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example, indicates that Congress was concerned over whether
the legislation would "stimulate the producer and so benefit the
public. ' 13 2 "While some limitations and conditions on copyright
are essential in the public interest," the report said, "they
should not be so burdensome and strict as to deprive authors of
their just reward. '133
The Supreme Court, however, has recently diluted even this
Congressional interest in artists receiving fair compensation. In
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,3 4 the
Court said:
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly,
like the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution,
reflects a balance of competing claims upon the public interest:
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private mo-
tivation must ultimately serve the cause of promoting broad pub-
lic availability of literature, music, and the other arts. The imme-
diate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an
'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incen-
tive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.
'The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in
conferring the monopoly,' this Court has said, 'lie in the general
benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.' When
technological change has rendered its literal terms ambiguous, the
Copyright Act must be construed in light of this basic purpose.13
Thus, the monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize
are neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide special
benefits to authors or the creators of other forms of art. Rather,
the limited grant is a means by which an important public pur-
pose may be achieved. It is intended - for the ultimate benefit
of the public - to motivate the creative activity of authors and
inventors by the provision of a special reward and ultimately to
allow the public free and unlimited access to the products of the
artist's creative genius after a limited period of exclusive control
has expired.
132. REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 87TH CONG., 1ST SESS., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION 5
(Comm. Print 1961) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1909)).
133. Id. at 6.
134. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
135. Id. at 431 (quoting with approval Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422
U.S. 151, 156 (1974) (footnote and citations omitted, emphasis added)).
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American law's general lack of solicitude for authors, artists,
and other creative individuals may be illustrated by its stipula-
tions concerning works-for-hire. The copyright law confers ini-
tial ownership of a copyright upon the author or authors of a
work136 but declares that where the work is made for hire "the
employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is
considered the author ... and, unless the parties have expressly
agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns
all of the rights comprised in the copyright."' 37 Thus, works
commissioned by a contracting party are considered works made
for hire if they fall into one of the specific categories enumerated
in the Act and the parties have executed a contract designating
the work as one made for hire. 3 8 Alternatively, if the person
who executes the work is an employee of the purported copy-
right holder and has created the work in the course of his em-
ployment, then the copyright belongs to the employer. 3 9 Some
case law has suggested that the requirement of a written agree-
ment may not be absolute if the relationship between the parties
can reasonably be construed to be an employer-employee rela-
tionship, 4" but other cases suggest that the meaning of "em-
136. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1982).
137. Id. § 201(b).
138. Id. § 101. This section defines "work made for hire":
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employ-
ment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a
collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a trans-
lation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a
test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a
written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made
for hire.
Id.
139. Id.
140. Aldon Accessories, Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 982 (1984). Aldon had directed a Taiwanese manufacturer in the design of certain
figurines, and had copyrighted the resulting designs. Spiegel marketed identical figu-
rines. Id. at 549-50. When sued for copyright infringement, Spiegel claimed that Aldon's
copyright was invalid, for statuary does not fall under the Act, and in any event, the
parties had not signed an express contract. Id. at 551. The jury found for Aldon, and the
court affirmed, holding that an employer-employee relationship had existed between Al-
don and the Taiwanese firm that manufactured the figurines (noting that one of Aldon's
principals had personally supervised and controlled the rendering of the designs in
question).
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ployee" may be construed quite literally and very narrowly."'
The unequal bargaining power of authors and artists as
against publishers and those who purchase and sell their art
often leaves the former powerless against the latter. Work-for-
hire contracts may become the norm, as Elmer Bernstein, repre-
senting the Screen Composers of America, has testified. Al-
though he is considered one of the top composers in his field and
commands high fees, he claims that if he were to refuse to sign
work-for-hire clauses he "would have to consider some other
field of work."1 2
Because of the preemptive power of Congressional copyright
legislation, the personal rights of authors in their creations, if
any, were originally enforceable only through state courts and
legislatures. This reliance on the states and an assortment of
common-law theories has led to "inconsistent, uncertain, and
somewhat inadequate" protection of the rights of authors, whose
interests often tend to be subordinated, at least in the federal
law, to those of others of whom the law is more solicitous." 3
C. The Right of Disclosure
Prior to the enactment of the Copyright Act of 1976,1"' each
state's common-law copyright granted an author and his heirs a
perpetual right of first publication. 15 This right closely resem-
bles the moral right of disclosure in its personal character, its
survival beyond the author's death, and its affinity with the
spirit of natural law.
However, when the Copyright Act of 1976 officially abol-
ished common-law copyright,"" the right of first publication, i.e.,
141. Id. at 552. Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children and Adults of Louisiana, Inc.
v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1280 (1988),
which holds that a work cannot be "made for hire" unless "the seller is an employee
within the meaning of agency law." Id. at 334-35.
142. Definition of Work Made for Hire in the Copyright Act of 1976: Hearings on S.
2044 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1982) (state-
ment of Elmer Bernstein, Screen Composers of America) [hereinafter Hearings on S.
2044].
143. Note, supra note 115, at 809.
144. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982).
145. See Treece, American Law Analogues of the Author's "Moral Right," 16 AM. J.
COMP. L. 487, 488 (1968).
146. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a):
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disclosure, was subsumed into the federal scheme of protection,
thus divesting the right of its perpetuity and, one may assume,
any "natural right" quality it may have had under the common
law. In addition to copyright protection, the tort of unfair com-
petition offers some recourse to an artist seeking to vindicate a
right ancillary to that of disclosure, namely, the right to retain
control over a salient element of the work, even after copyright
has been transferred. In Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Colum-
bia Broadcasting System, 147 for example, the court held that
Dashiell Hammett could continue to exploit the character of
Sam Spade and license others to do so, even though he had con-
veyed all rights in The Maltese Falcon to Warner Brothers. 1 8
The outcome is different, of course, when rights are con-
veyed under a work-for-hire clause. An artist who has accepted
such a contract, say, for graphics for a book, may discover too
late that the publisher has used her artwork to illustrate the
book's cover, while she thought that she was bargaining for the
less expensive interior illustrations. Moreover, she has no legally
cognizable claim against the publisher's choice of colors, though
she finds them distasteful. " 9
Although the right of disclosure appears adequately pro-
tected in the United States, it is important to remember the
qualitative difference between the concepts of natural right and
property right.150 In France, an artist can withhold a work from
someone who has contracted for it if she in good faith decides
that it is incomplete. 5 ' In the United States, courts may be
more willing to award damages to a plaintiff in a like
situation.1 51
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to
any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright... are governed
exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or
equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any state.
Id.
147. 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955).
148. Id. at 948-51.
149. Hearings on S. 2044, supra note 142 (statement of Robin Brickman, Graphic
Artists Guild).
150. See supra text accompanying notes 1-4; see also Note, supra note 115, at 795-
96.
151. DaSilva, supra note 1, at 19 n.133 (citing Judgment of March 19, 1947, Cour
d'appel, Paris 1949 [D.P.] 20).
152. Sarraute, supra note 7, at 485.
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D. The Right of Withdrawal or Modification
The right to withdraw or modify a work that has previously
been sold or published because it is no longer faithful to the art-
ist's vision has no analogue in American law.'53 As we will see,
however, the right to disclaim authorship of such a work has
gained a limited degree of acceptance. 15 4
E. The Right of Paternity
The right to be credited as the author of one's own work is
the first component of the right to paternity. In an early case,
Clemens v. Press Publishing,55 Mark Twain sued to recover the
price of a story he had sold to a publisher. 56 The publisher, af-
ter accepting the story, refused to print it with Twain's by-
line. 5  Twain objected to the anonymous publication of his
work, and the publisher refused to pay him the price on which
they had earlier agreed.15 8
The court held in Twain's favor as to the issue of price, be-
cause it viewed the contract for the sale of the story to be
valid. 5" Twain's refusal to consent to the publication without
his name, however, was deemed to be ineffectual:
Title to the manuscript having passed by the completed contract
... the defendant was not obligated to publish it at all, nor could
plaintiff compel or prevent its publication, with or without his
name. The objections, refusals and wishes of the plaintiff after
parting with the title in the property may betray the eccentrici-
ties of the author, but they have no greater weight in law than the
wishes of a stranger to the transaction after it was consum-
mated. 60
A stronger repudiation of the artist's moral right of pater-
nity in favor of property rights could not easily be found. The
sharp focus on the contract as the ultimate source of the rights
153. Id. See infra text accompanying notes 329-335.
154. See infra text accompanying notes 276-278 and 300-301.
155. 67 Misc. 183, 122 N.Y.S. 206 (App. Term N.Y. County 1910).
156. Id. at 184, 122 N.Y.S. at 206.
157. Id. at 184, 122 N.Y.S. at 207.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 185, 122 N.Y.S. at 207.
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of the parties is a recurring theme in the cases that follow."' 1
Judge Seabury's majority opinion in Clemens enunciates
"the best early statement of the basic idea of moral right"16 2 in
American common law:
Even the matter of fact attitude of the law does not require
us to consider the sale of the rights to a literary production in the
same way that we would consider the sale of a barrel of pork....
The man who sells a barrel of pork to another may pocket the
purchase price and retain no further interest in what becomes of
the pork. While an author may write to earn his living and may
sell his literary productions, yet the purchaser, in the absence of a
contract which permits him so to do, cannot make as free a use of
them as he could of the pork which he purchased .... [Tihe au-
thor is entitled ... to have it [his work] published in the manner
in which he wrote it. The purchaser cannot ... omit altogether
the name of the author, unless his contract with the latter per-
mits him so to do.' 8s
Judge Seabury's eloquent commentary on the moral rights
of authors is often quoted in support of the proposition that art
merits special treatment in property law.'" His emphasis on the
contract as the controlling factor presages the prominence of
contractual considerations in later cases."6 5
Another oft-cited case, Vargas v. Esquire 6 addresses the
artist's paternity interest and specifically discusses moral
rights.167 In Vargas, the plaintiff sought to enjoin the magazine
from publishing his drawings (known as Varga Girls) without
his signature.6 8 Although Vargas had transferred "title and
ownership,... possession, control and use"119 of all of the draw-
ings to the defendant, he argued that there was an implied
agreement between him and Esquire that each drawing would
bear his signature, that labelling the drawings Esquire Girls was
161. See supra text accompanying notes 132-142, 155-160; see infra text and accom-
panying notes 166-170.
162. Diamond, supra note 5, at 250.
163. Clemens, 67 Misc. at 183-84, 122 N.Y.S. at 207.
164. See Diamond, supra note 5, at 250; see also Note, supra note 2, at 866.
165. See Kury, supra note 1, at 14-15; see also Note, supra note 2, at 866.
166. 164 F.2d 522 (7th Cir. 1947).
167. Id. at 525.
168. Id. at 523.
169. Id. at 525.
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misleading and constituted unfair competition, and finally, that
he had a moral right to be credited as the artist on his own
works.171
The court found against Vargas on all three claims. 7' The
contract was treated as having unambiguously transferred all
rights in the drawings to Esquire, or, more precisely, all of the
rights the court was willing to recognize. 72 The court discerned
nothing misleading about the omission of Vargas' signature 7 1
and dismissed the "so-called 'moral rights' ,,174 as a foreign con-
cept, displaying a legal provincialism that is all too prevalent in
some of the courts. 175
Under French law, Vargas clearly would have prevailed, as
did the artist in Guille,'76 in which the contract explicitly pro-
vided that Guille's real name be omitted from his work. The
French court had no qualms about voiding the contract to pro-
tect Guille's moral right even against his own earlier agreement
to limit it. This paternalistic solicitude for the interests of artists
stands in stark contrast to the passive, laissez-faire attitude of
the Vargas court. In these two cases, the basic differences be-
tween the orientations of the two systems stand out in bold re-
lief: In American courts, the eyes of the judges are focused
squarely on the four corners of the contract and its dispositions
of economic rights. In France, the natural law moral right of the
artist in his creation takes precedence over the freedom to con-
tract, and economic considerations become subordinate.
In France and the United States, motion pictures are af-
forded special treatment, 177 for in their creation so many artists
- screenwriters, actors, directors, cinematographers, set design-
ers, and others - must collaborate to produce the ultimate work
that it is impossible to attribute "authorship" to any one of
them. Under current French law, it is presumed that the various
170. Id. at 524-26.
171. Id. at 527.
172. Id. at 525.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 526.
175. See id.
176. For a discussion of Guile, see supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
177. See Colby, Copyright Revision Revisited: Commissioned Works as Works Made
for Hire under the United States Copyright Act, 5 WHrrrlR L. REV. 491 (1983).
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artists employed in the creation of a motion picture film have
transferred their rights in the film to the party who has commis-
sioned the film, i.e., the producer.178 However, the law delineates
the amount to be paid to authors, identifies those who are re-
sponsible to pay, and requires an accounting by the producer.
179
It remains to be seen, however, whether this approach will suc-
ceed in striking an appropriate balance between the opposing in-
terests of producers and artists.
The apparent dichotomy between the approaches of French
and American law can be deceptive. American law has become
progressively, if slowly, more responsive to the special character
of art and artists' personality rights,' 80 while French law has im-
posed restrictions on the exercise of the artist's moral rights
where failure to do so would have resulted in manifest injus-
tice.18 1 Moreover, it is often exceedingly difficult to draw a clear
distinction between the parties' personal rights and their finan-
cial interests in a work of art. In both systems, there appears to
be a continual accommodation between theory and practice that
draws them closer together than a superficial examination might
lead one to suppose.
The second component of the right of paternity, the right to
prevent false attribution of one's work to someone else, has been
derided, even in France, as surplusage. Its critics assert that
there are less restrictive legal means, such as the law of pla-
giarism, to protect adequately against any unauthorized appro-
priation."8 2
Werlin v. Reader's Digest Association,"3 however, reveals
the lacunae in the protection offered by the doctrines of copy-
right and unfair competition. In Werlin, plaintiff wrote an origi-
nal article chronicling the struggle and success of a young girl
afflicted with Down's Syndrome. 184 The article was published lo-
cally, Werlin obtained the copyright on it, and later submitted it
178. Id. at 504.
179. Fran~on, The Audiovisual Production Contract, 127 REVUE INTERNATIONALE Du
DROIT D'AUTEUR 70, 84-87 (1986).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 25-26.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 91-106.
182. DaSilva, supra note 1, at 30.
183. 528 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
184. Id. at 454-55.
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to Reader's Digest for possible publication. For nearly a decade,
she had been submitting her work to Reader's Digest, but the
magazine's editors had rejected every piece she had sent while
encouraging her to continue her submissions. 185 Reader's Digest
never advised her that the topic idea might be appropriated
from one of her manuscripts and used in a new article composed
by the magazine's staff.18" This is what in fact occurred with her
manuscript on the Down's Syndrome case. She sued the
Reader's Digest Association, alleging copyright infringement, un-
fair competition, and unjust enrichment.187 The court held
against her on the first two claims " but awarded her five hun-
dred dollars on the unjust enrichment claim. " The court's ra-
tionale was found in equity: "To permit RDA [Reader's Digest
Association] to refuse to pay any compensation to Werlin would
be, notwithstanding the fact that RDA did not act in bad faith,
to permit an injustice of the most fundamental sort."'190
It is not surprising that the court resorted to an equitable,
quasi-contract theory.' 91 The legal remedies available did not
protect the interest that Reader's Digest had violated. Whether
that interest was proprietary or personal is difficult to discern. If
purely proprietary, it appears anomalous that copyright and un-
fair competition offered no protection. The award, however, was
styled in compensation, not damages, indicating that Werlin's
interest in the topic idea was a pecuniary one. 192
On the other hand, the Seabury opinion in Clemens'93 re-
minds us that the commercial nature of an artist's work should
not nullify a moral right. Ultimately, Werlin's interest can best
be described as a point on a continuum of moral and economic
rights. Her interest fell at the periphery of American judicial
protection, while likely landing much deeper in territory to
which the French would have extended their protection. If she
185. Id. at 456-57.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 459.
188. Id. at 464-65.
189. Id. at 468.
190. Id. at 466.
191. See id.
192. Id. at 467-68.
193. 67 Misc. 183, 122 N.Y.S. 206 (App. Term N.Y. County 1910). See supra notes
155-165 and accompanying text.
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had been residing in France, the French courts would probably
have upheld her moral right of paternity in her work, with the
concomitant right to be recognized as author of the article that
had been published, albeit without her permission and not in
the form in which she had originally written it.' Her award, if
any, would have depended upon the court's assessment of the
extent of her moral interest in the work. 195
The right to disclaim authorship of work not one's own
overlaps the right of paternity. An artist may "disown" a crea-
tion, for instance, if it has been altered to such an extent that it
becomes a different work. This right, however, does not prohibit
the alteration itself. The artist may merely enjoin another
against falsely attributing work to him.""
Artists in the United States have attempted to assert this
right under the guise of actions for libel, violations of the right
to privacy or the right to publicity, and unfair competition.
These theories offer some chance of relief to the aggrieved artist,
but essentially fall short in comparison with the more pervasive
force and scope of the rights recognized by the French courts.
Allegations of libel have on occasion proved effective in de-
fending the right against false attribution. In Clevenger v. Baker
Voorhis & Co., 97 plaintiff was the author of Clevenger's Annual
Practice of New York.198 He transferred the work together with
the copyright to defendant, and served as editor for thirteen
consecutive annual revisions of the work. 99 Then, in 1956, Clev-
enger declined to edit any further editions and refused to con-
sent to the use of his name as editor of future editions.200 In
1959, defendant published the work as Clevenger's Annual
Practice of New York 1959, Annually Revised, without plain-
tiff's approval or consent.2 1 In fact, plaintiff took no part in the
194. See supra notes 71-88 and accompanying text.
195. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
196. See California Art Preservation Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 987 (West Supp. 1985);
New York Artists' Authorship Act, N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 14.51-.59 (McKinney
1983); see also infra text accompanying notes 246-249.
197. 8 N.Y.2d 187, 168 N.E.2d 643, 203 N.Y.S.2d 812 (1960).
198. Id. at 189, 168 N.E.2d at 644, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 189-90, 168 N.E.2d at 644, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
[Vol. 9:1
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol9/iss1/1
ARTISTS' RIGHTS
revisions, which were made by defendant's staff.2 02 The 1959 edi-
tion allegedly contained numerous errors. 20 3 The court held that
the complaint stated a cause of action for libel, because a rea-
sonable person could attribute the errors to the plaintiff.2 4
So far as authors are concerned, however, the interest that
libel laws were designed to protect was not the artist's creative
personality, but his general good standing in the community.2 5
Even if it were possible to fine-tune the focus of a libel action so
as to make it more sensitive to the author's moral rights, or, to
put the matter somewhat differently, her rights of artistic and
creative expression, the author in any event faces a serious di-
lemma: she must have a discernible reputation in the commu-
nity to sustain a libel claim relating to misattribution, but such
public renown often confers upon her the status of a public fig-
ure. As every student of first amendment cases knows, plaintiffs
who happen also to be public figures must overcome extremely
demanding burdens of proof in order to succeed in libel
actions.2 °0
These obstacles make libel an unwieldy shield for moral
right at best. The right to privacy appears to be more tightly
tailored to the personal character of the interests involved.20 7
Privacy's alter ego, the right to publicity, has served to protect
the artist against unauthorized use of her name or likeness. 2 8
Whereas the right to privacy dies with the artist, the right to
publicity survives her.09
The right to publicity, however, drops its conceptual anchor
squarely in the financial zone of the moral-economic continuum.
The artist alleging a violation of her right to publicity must
show that her name or likeness was misappropriated for com-
mercial gain.21 0 As with actions for libel or unfair competition,
recovery may well hinge on the exploitative value to defendants
202. Id.
203. Id. at 189, 168 N.E.2d at 644, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
204. Id. at 190, 168 N.E.2d at 645, 203 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
205. See id. See also Ben-Oliel v. Press Publishing Co., 251 N.Y. 250, 167 N.E. 432
(1929); and Note, supra note 2, at 871-72, 880.
206. Note, supra note 2, at 871-72; Diamond, supra note 5, at 265.
207. Note, supra note 2, at 880.
208. Id. at 884; DaSilva, supra note 1, at 44.
209. Note, supra note 2, at 885; but cf DaSilva, supra note 1, at 844.
210. See Note, supra note 2, at 883.
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of plaintiff's name or likeness rather than the abuse of any
moral right.
Unfair competition has emerged as an unexpectedly flexible
theory upon which claims against moral rights violators can be
based. The doctrine's "very name suggests exploitation and
value accruing therefrom.... The theory of unfair competition
depends upon the fortuitous fact that to present a deformed
work to the public may economically injure the creator by de-
priving him of his market .... "I
Despite its property right orientation, the tort of unfair
competition has been stretched to cover unauthorized appropri-
ation and misattribution of art works.s12 In Follett v. New
American Library,s" 3 the best-selling novelist Ken Follett sought
to enjoin a publisher from crediting him as the principal author
of a work of nonfiction which he had edited and revised years
before, when he was virtually unknown. Follett had worked with
the principal author, whose name had appeared first in the origi-
nal edition.2 4 The issue before the court was whether the mag-
nitude and aesthetic impact of the "revisions" Follett made in
the work reasonably supported a representation that he was the
principal author of the "new and improved" manuscript.2 15 Es-
sentially, the court for the first time 16 assumed the task of mea-
suring the creative process by an "objective" standard - i.e., by
its own wits.2 1 7 After discussing the literary merits of Follett's
contribution to the work, the court concluded that he had in-
deed gone beyond mere editing but enjoyed "none of the special
creative attributes . . . [of] authorship.2 18 Consequently, the
211. Note, supra note 1, at 567-68; cf. Clevenger v. Baker Voorhis & Co., 8 N.Y.2d
187, 190, 168 N.E.2d 643, 644-45, 203 N.Y.S.2d 812, 814-15 (1960) (injury to author's
reputation pleaded in terms of lost market for author's work); but cf. Merryman, supra
note 12, at 1031 n.23 (citing Martin-Caille v. Bergerot, Cass. civ. ire 1969 D.S. Jur. 73)
(marketing practices detrimental to artist's reputation not compensable under DROIT
MORAL).
212. See generally Comment, Moral Rights for Artists Under the Lanham Act: Gil-
liam v. American Broadcasting Co., 18 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 595 (1977); Maslow, supra
note 16; Sokolow, supra note 24.
213. 497 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
214. Id. at 306-07.
215. Id. at 311-12.
216. Id. at 306.
217. Id. at 312.
218. Id. at 313.
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court held that to represent Follett as the principal author
would be false and misleading under the unfair competition pro-
visions of the Lanham Act on trademarks.2 19
The significance of Follett goes far beyond the mere fact
that it makes use of the unfair competition theory. Its express
recognition of the "special attributes" of creativity marks it as
yet another milestone in American jurisprudence in the moral
rights area. In grappling for the first time in a direct manner
with the elusive concept of authorship,220 the court took an im-
portant step toward reorienting the treatment of artists in
American law.
F. The Right of Integrity
This branch of the family of moral rights is considered the
most vital to the moral security of artists. Until recently, how-
ever, American law has been unresponsive to the plight of artists
whose works have been altered, mutilated, or destroyed without
their consent. The sculptor David Smith was powerless to enjoin
the owner of one of his sculptures from stripping it of its original
color.2" Similarly, Alexander Calder had no recourse when the
owner of one of his mobiles repainted it in a color scheme alto-
gether different from the one Calder had envisioned for it, and
curtailed its free-floating movement by mechanization.222 The
Japanese artist Noguchi was without a remedy against a pur-
chaser of one of his works who cut it up and stored it after it
had been on open display for a number of years.223
One of the most telling examples of this absence of protec-
tion for the integrity of works of art in the United States is
Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church.22' Alfred D. Crimi, a
219. Id. In Rich v. RCA Corp., 390 F. Supp. 530 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), the court held that
a recent picture of the plaintiff on the cover of an album containing old recordings was a
misrepresentation that the songs were new. The court reached the same conclusion in
similar cases. See Benson v. Paul Winley Record Sales Corp., 452 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); CBS, Inc. v. Springboard Int'l Records, 429 F. Supp. 563 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
220. 497 F. Supp. at 312.
221. Merryman, supra note 12, at 1039-40; Note, supra note 14, at 1201.
222. Bostron, The New Artists' Authorship Rights Bill, ART & ARTIsTs, September
1983, at 28.
223. Note, The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act: Increased Protection and
Enhanced Status for Visual Artists, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 158, 162 (1984).
224. 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1949).
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well-known artist, was commissioned to paint a fresco on the
wall of the defendant church.2 2 5 The fresco was duly completed
and Crimi was paid.22 Some years later, the defendant church
ordered the Crimi fresco effaced because congregational opinion
had turned against the work.2 2 1 Crimi objected and brought suit,
alleging breach of implied agreement in the contract and viola-
tion of his continued interest in the fresco. 2 8 He also accused
the defendant of committing "an antisocial act and one against
public policy."22 9 The church prevailed on the ground that the
contract commissioning the fresco reserved no "continuing
rights" to Crimi. The court explicitly brushed aside the moral
rights argument,230 reiterating the Clemens court's holding that
the contract is the source of the rights of the parties. "The time
for the artist to have reserved any rights was when he and his
attorney participated in the drawing of the contract ... 231
It is no secret that the bargaining power of artists is not
always as strong as the Crimi court seems to have imagined. But
at least one groundbreaking case involved artists who did exer-
cise their bargaining power at the time of contract formation. In
Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co.,2 3 2 Monty Python, the
British comedy troupe, secured a preliminary injunction against
ABC Television, preventing the telecast of Monty Python pro-
grams that had been substantially edited by ABC .23  The deci-
sion rested in part on the ground that Monty Python had con-
tractually reserved the exclusive right to edit the program's
script and to make any changes in the program once it was
recorded.234
The emphasis on contractual rights was not, as we have
seen, a novel analytic approach. The real innovation in Gilliam
was the court's use of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act2 35 to en-
225. Id. at 572, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 571-72, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
228. Id. at 572, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 576, 89 N.Y.S.2d at 819.
231. Id.
232. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 21.
235. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970).
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force what was essentially the Monty Python group's moral right
to the integrity of their work.2"6 After giving a sympathetic nod
toward the Continental concept of moral right,37 the court ad-
vanced a theoretical compromise that attempted to harmonize
the perceived differences between the American and French tra-
ditions regarding artists' rights:
American copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize
moral rights or provide a cause of action for their violation, since
the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than the personal,
rights of authors. Nevertheless, the economic incentive for artistic
and intellectual creation that serves as the foundation for Ameri-
can copyright law . . . cannot be reconciled with the inability of
artists to obtain relief for mutilation or misrepresentation of their
work to the public on which the artists are financially
dependent.2 8
In his opinion for the court, Judge Lumbard attempted to
rationalize the recognition of artists' personal rights by defining
those rights in economic terms, most particularly in terms of ar-
tistic reputation.23 9 This interest in the public image of the artist
has been the central point in the continuum, the gray area in
which economic and moral rights coalesce. It has been the ful-
crum of the American common-law defense of personal rights,
whether the theory was libel, e invasion of privacy,241 the right
to publicity,24 2 or unfair competition.2,4 Injury to reputation led
236. See Comment, supra note 212, at 595-96.
237. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 23-24.
238. Id. at 24.
239. Id. at 14.
240. 8 N.Y.2d 187, 168 N.E.2d 643, 203 N.Y.S.2d 812. See supra note 197 and ac-
companying text.
241. See Note, supra note 2, at 871; Big Seven Music Corp. v. Lennon, 554 F.2d 504
(2d Cir. 1977) (John Lennon succeeded in enjoining distribution of poorly recorded and
packaged album of his work because it amounted to mutilation and invasion of privacy).
242. See Note, supra note 2, at 884-86 (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad-
casting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (petitioner brought damage action against broadcasters
for violating his state law right to publicity by airing a videotape of his human can-
nonball act on television; Supreme Court held in favor of broadcasters on constitutional
grounds)).
243. See Werlin, 528 F. Supp. 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); see also Benson v. Paul Winley
Record Sales Corp., 452 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (record manufacturer and distribu-
tor's use of recent picture of artist on album cover and distortion of recording made
years earlier constituted misleading labeling).
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the way to a possible showing of financial or tangible damages,
something the American system was theoretically equipped to
handle. In Gilliam, Judge Lumbard unearthed the philosophy
underlying copyright legislation to solidify the bridge he erected
between the two traditions. " He simply asserted that copy-
right's high-sounding purpose of fostering artistic and intellec-
tual creation would best be served if the artist's right "to have
his work attributed to him in the form in which he created it"24 5
was accorded adequate protection.
Judge Gurfein's Gilliam concurrence exposed the flaw in
Judge Lumbard's position when Judge Gurfein asserted that the
Lanham Act merely prohibits misattribution and does not ex-
tend protection to the integrity of the work.240 The concurrence
rejected the severity of injunction in favor of a simple disclaimer
at the beginning of the telecast to cure the misleading attribu-
tion.147 This is an argument to treat Monty Python's case in the
same manner as Follett's, that is, as pertaining to misleading la-
beling, rather than as an attack on the integrity of the work.
While Judge Gurfein's view may be correct in theory (in the
purist sense), Judge Lumbard's innovation gained some support
in Benson v. Paul Winley Sales Corp.,2 48 in which a celebrated
jazz musician sought a preliminary injunction to restrain a rec-
ord manufacturer and distributor from producing an album con-
taining an altered version of a recording he had made years ear-
lier when he was a subordinate player in an obscure group. The
defendants had amplified Benson's guitar track and dubbed in a
woman's suggestively moaning voice.2 4' The album cover fea-
tured a recent picture of Benson and the words "X RatedLP.,,1250
The court held that the defendants had falsely labelled the
album as Benson's work, because the tampering had rendered it
stylistically unrepresentative and misleading.2 51 The accent in
244. 538 F.2d at 23-24.
245. Id. at 24.
246. Id. at 27.
247. Id.
248. 452 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
249. Id. at 517.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 518.
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the court's reasoning was on reputation: "People induced to buy
the album... may be disappointed in its style and contents...
and [may] mistakenly believe that Benson endorses 'X Rated'
material. Thus defendants ... have deceitfully packaged and ad-
vertised a product that is anathema to Benson, and a threat to
his professional standing and personal stature.11151
Enforcement of this "integrity" right via unfair competition
theory is not without its limits, even at this early stage. In Gee v.
CBS, Inc.,253 the court declared that technologically refining an
old recording and reissuing it in a truthful format did not
amount to unfair competition. 54 The court added, however, that
if the original recording had been tampered with in an abusive
or derogatory manner, the decision might have been other-
wise. 5 This express reference to the integrity of the work itself,
as filtered through the scrim of artistic reputation, suggests that
a workable analogue to the right of integrity may finally be tak-
ing root in American law.
The artist Richard Serra sued the United States General
Services Administration (GSA) on the ground that the GSA vio-
lated his moral rights in deciding to remove his sculpture, Tilted
Arc, from Federal Plaza in lower Manhattan. 5' He claimed that
his work was integral to the space in which it had been placed,
that the space was integral to the work, and that the two could
not be divorced without defacing the sculpture." 7
Focusing on the fact that the work constituted a kind of
purpresture,2 5 Judge Milton Pollack concluded that Serra had
"alleged extremely abstract violations of constitutional
rights. . . . The constitutional claims present novel concepts
and would constitute new restraints on the management of gov-
ernment property and the contractual commitments which may
252. Id. (emphasis added).
253. 471 F. Supp. 600 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
254. Id. at 659.
255. Id. at 659-60.
256. Serra v. United States General Services Admin., 664 F. Supp. 798, 799
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
257. Id. at 800.
258. A purpresture is "[a]n inclosure by a private person of a part of that which
belongs to and ought to be open and free to the enjoyment of the public at large."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1112 (5th ed. 1979).
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be made in connection therewith. '259 Serra's claim that reloca-
tion would constitute a first amendment violation by "destroy-
ing" his work, because it was solely intended for its original site,
was dismissed. 260 His claim that relocation would "misrepresent"
his authorship in violation of the copyright and trademark law
was also dismissed.261 Although these cases have set some impor-
tant precedents, they are of course not sufficient to provide art-
ists who sell their work in the United States the extensive pro-
tection that European artists enjoy. To accomplish this goal,
legislation is indispensable.
Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts introduced a
bill in 1987262 that would significantly expand the rights of vis-
ual artists to safeguard their work and to share in the increases
in its value by providing for resale royalties of seven percent for
artists.26 3 Senator Kennedy's bill would also have provided for
an artist's right to sue for damages if the owner negligently or
deliberately damaged a work in his collection that had been cre-
ated by the artist, and would have provided for the artist's right
to disavow the work if it had been changed or distorted.2 6' At
the time of this writing, the bill had not passed, and for the fore-
seeable future, at least, it appears unlikely that Congress will
accord it a very high priority.
IV. State Legislation
There are other important indicia of the vitality of moral
rights in the United States - most especially the California Art
Preservation Act of 1980,2Il and the New York Artists' Author-
ship Rights Act of 1983.266 It is not surprising that these two
states should be in the forefront in advocacy of artists' rights,
for both are major centers of creative activity. Other states, in-
259. 664 F. Supp. at 807.
260. Id. at 805.
261. Id. at 801.
262. S. 1619, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (proposed amendments to Copyright Act,
17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 106, 113, 401).
263. Id. § 3.
264. Id.
265. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988).
266. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW arts. 11-15 (McKinney 1987) (repealed 1984) (rele-
vant sections replaced by §§ 11.01 and 14.03 (1984)).
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cluding Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, and New Jersey, have
passed legislation concerning the buying and selling of art or of
artists' rights in or following such sales.267 What follows is a brief
examination of the goals, substance, and scope of the principal
statutes-those of California and New York-and an evaluation
of the potential effectiveness of each.
A. The California Art Preservation Act
The California Act asserts that "physical alteration or de-
struction of fine art, which is an expression of the artist's per-
sonality, is detrimental to the artist's reputation .... ,,218 The
"public interest in preserving the integrity of cultural artistic
creations "269 and the artist's personality rights are given as the
statute's raison d'etre. The Act gives the artist whose works of
"fine art" are of "recognized quality" a cause of action for equi-
table and legal relief against anyone who intentionally defaces,
mutilates, alters, or destroys the work.27 0 The artist is also free
"at all times . . . to claim authorship, or, for just and valid rea-
son, to disclaim authorship of his or her work of fine art. '271 The
rights conferred by the statute vest in the artist for life, and af-
ter death to his heirs for a period of fifty years. 2 The scheme
limits protection to a rather narrow segment of the creative com-
munity, fine artists. Under the statutory definition, fine art in-
cludes "an original painting, sculpture, or drawing .... ,,27  Thus,
all literary, musical, dramatic, and cinematic art is excluded.274
Furthermore, the Act covers only those works of fine art recog-
nized by "[other] artists, art dealers, collectors of fine art, cura-
tors of art museums, and other persons involved with the crea-
tion or marketing of fine art"27" to be of good quality. This
contrasts with French law, which protects what it considers to
267. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 2154 (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303
(1988); MASS. GEN. L. ch. 231, § 85S (1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-1-A-8 (1987).
268. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(a).
269. Id.
270. Id. §§ 987(a), (b)(2), (c)(1).
271. Id. § 987(d).
272. Id. § 987(g)(1).
273. Id. § 987(b)(2).
274. Id.
275. Id. § 987(f).
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be the natural right inherent in the creative act, regardless of
the caliber of the creation.2 7 Moreover, the California Act dif-
fers from French law in that it excludes from its purview works
created under contract for commercial use.2 Thus, if Vargas
brought suit against Esquire today, he could not count on any
protection from California's Art Preservation Act. The Act does
extend coverage, however, to art attached to buildings.2 8 Crimi
might have been able to invoke the Act to save his fresco, which
the court in that case deemed to be part of the defendant's real
estate.2 9
The deference shown in Crimi and other cases to the con-
tract as the ultimate arbiter of the rights of the parties
resurfaces in the California Act's provision allowing express
written waiver of any rights granted thereunder.2 80 Thus, the
scope of the statute is further constricted to cover only fine art-
ists whose stature confers upon them sufficient bargaining power
to resist inducements to waive their rights under the law. The
establishment of a Registry for Fine Art to be administered by
the state Arts Council has been proposed as one way to deal
with the problem of determining which works of art are worthy
of protection.2 ' Any artist wishing to declare formally that he
believes his work is of high quality and merits protection under
the Act may register the work for such protection.2 82 While not
conclusive, registration is evidence that the work is coverable
under the law and serves to put prospective purchasers on notice
that the artist claims all rights conferred by the Act.28 The Cali-
fornia Act extends its protection, within the limits described, to
the interests of integrity and paternity. The integrity right is
far-reaching in that it protects against intentional mutilation
and destruction, whether or not the work is publicly dis-
played.2 84 It is the work itself and not merely the artist's reputa-
276. Sarraute, supra note 10, at 479 (noting Law of 1957, supra note 6, at 2).
277. CAL. CiV. CODE § 987(b)(2).
278. Id. § 987(h)(1).
279. Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570, 576, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813, 819
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1949).
280. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(g)(3).
281. Note, supra note 14, at 1229.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(c)(1).
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tion that receives this protection.2 85 In this way, society's inter-
est in preservation is safeguarded. Even though the right of
integrity is not perpetual, the drafters apparently assumed that
any art worthy of preservation would enjoy de facto protection
derived from public consensus of its worth, after the statutory
period had run. The statutory "paternity right" to claim author-
ship or to disclaim it for a "just and valid reason"286 closely ap-
proximates its French analogue.2 87 The California Act, however,
mandates closer inquiry into the reasons for the disclaimer and
permits the artist to waive the right entirely.288
B. The New York Artists' Authorship Rights Act
In contrast to the California Act, which embraces to a con-
siderable extent the notion that our law must expressly alter its
traditional theoretical antipathy to personal rights, the New
York Act adheres more to the principle that a property-oriented
legal order can be adjusted to accommodate moral rights on its
own terms. The New York Act is designed to protect the artist's
interest in his reputation, much along the lines of Judge Lum-
bard's approach in Gilliam.289 Its scope is also limited to the
work of fine artists, including "a painting, sculpture, drawing, or
work of graphic art, and print, but not multiples."'2 90
Although New York does not distinguish between art of
"recognized quality" and that which is "unrecognized," it is ar-
guable that New York affords no greater protection for obscure
artists than does California. New York's sharp focus on reputa-
tion requires that the artist have a reputation before he can be
damaged, and that the damage must be "reasonably likely to re-
sult" from the offending action. 291 This points to another funda-
mental difference between the two states' schemes. Under the
New York law, an artist has no remedy against an owner who
intentionally alters or even destroys his work, unless the owner
subsequently displays the work publicly, attributes it to the art-
285. Id.
286. Id. § 987(d).
287. See DaSilva, supra note 1, at 28, 30-31.
288. CAL. CtV. CODE § 987(g)(3).
289. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). See supra notes 233-246 and accompanying text.
290. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AvF. LAW § 11.01(9) (McKinney Supp. 1989).
291. Id. § 14.03(1).
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ist, and such attribution causes or is reasonably likely to cause
damage to the artist's reputation.292 As we have seen, there is no
such caveat regarding display in California.2 93 Complete destruc-
tion of the work is actionable in California but not in New York.
Both statutes, however, exclude works created under commercial
contract.294 New York's exclusion exempts from coverage works
"prepared under contract for advertising or trade use unless the
contract so provides. ' 295 Thus, the New York exclusion is argua-
bly narrower than California's "commercial use" language.2 9
Moreover, the New York Act expressly states that the exclusion
is waivable. 97 Therefore, if the New York statute had been in
force and Vargas had used his bargaining power shrewdly, he
could have brought his drawings within the statute's protective
ambit. The New York statute is silent as to waiver generally, but
most commentators speculate that contractual waiver would be
upheld.2 98 In any event, the rights conferred under the Act vest
only in the artist and terminate upon the artist's death.299 Pater-
nity rights granted under the Act closely parallel their California
counterparts: an artist has the right to be credited for his work
and to disclaim authorship for a "just and valid reason."3 °0 The
determination of what constitutes a just and valid reason turns
on a showing of harm to reputation, or the reasonable likelihood
of such harm.301 The right of integrity is similarly limited.30 2 Fi-
nally, the New York Act provides for both legal and injunctive
relief.303 These remedies are cast in the reputational mold as
well. -0 Damages can be assessed only by the economic yardstick
of reputation. 0 5 An injunction may not prevent further mutila-
tion, but merely could require that the work be labeled with a
292. Id. § 14.03.
293. Compare CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(c)(2) with N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03.
294. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(3)(d); CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(b)(2).
295. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.57(4).
296. CAL. CIV. CODE § 987(b)(2).
297. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(3)(d).
298. See Taubman, supra note 22, at 117-18; see also Bostron, supra note 223, at 28.
299. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(4)(a).
300. Id. § 14.03(2)(a).
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. § 14.03(4)(a).
304. Id. § 14.03.
305. Id.
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disclaimer. As this approach aligns closely with the Gurfein con-
currence in Gilliam, one may ask what real innovation the New
York Act purports to introduce.""
V. The Future of Moral Rights in the United States
Woody Allen and other film producers, exercised over what
they consider to be unconscionable interference with their artis-
tic integrity, have complained bitterly to Congress and in the
media about Congress' failure to enact legislation designed to af-
ford to artists residing and working in the United States the
protections enjoyed by artists residing in France and other coun-
tries that have adopted the moral rights doctrine. 07 The imme-
diate occasion for this outburst was the development of comput-
erized methods of adding color to films that had originally been
produced in black and white.308 No doubt some producers will
welcome this new technology, since some film viewers prefer
color films over black and white films. The advantage, as these
producers might see it, is that there will likely be a greater mar-
ket for their old films than would otherwise be the case, at least
for television broadcast and home video tapes, and they would
then reap the financial rewards that would go with renewed dis-
tribution of films that would otherwise gather dust in their li-
braries. From the point of view of such producers as Woody Al-
len, however, the artistic integrity of their films would be
seriously compromised by the artificial introduction of colors
where the films were originally shot in black and white with spe-
cific artistic intent. These producers are less interested in the
potential income from new rentals or sales of their films than in
the preservation of their work in the form in which they created
it. Although some members of Congress have expressed sympa-
thy for the plight of those artists whose works are affected by
these developments, the recently passed National Film Preserva-
306. Actions for libel (see supra notes 197-206 and accompanying text) and unfair
competition (see supra notes 170, 211-221 and accompanying text) already protect the
artist's reputation without affording any preventive measures against the alteration it-
self. The California Act does not improve upon this situation. See supra text accompa-
nying notes 277-288.
307. N.Y. Times, May 13, 1987, at C19, col. 1.
308. Id., Apr. 22, at D7, col. 1.
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tion Act of 1988 did not respond to the producers' concerns. 09
For our part, we are not certain that it should have. Moreover,
we have grave doubts about the wisdom of superimposing the
moral rights doctrine upon American law, at least as that doc-
trine has been promulgated and interpreted in France. From our
point of view, although the moral rights doctrine and the legisla-
tion that has arisen from it are infused with an admirable con-
cern for artists' rights, they are rather misguided in certain re-
spects and fail to account for the interests of other parties to the
transactions that take place between artists and their patrons or
customers. At the risk of oversimplification, we have divided the
interested parties into three classes: (1) the artists who create
and execute the works about which we are concerned, whether
they be literary, musical, or of more tangible form, such as
paintings, sculptures, and architectural structures; (2) the per-
sons who purchase those artistic creations; (3) the public, which
may be variously defined as the members of a particular geo-
graphical, political, or cultural community or as mankind in gen-
eral, both present and future. If we confine our attention for the
moment to the most typical case, one in which an artist, having
created a work of art, sells it either directly or through an agent
to some individual or group of individuals, we may perhaps ad-
dress some of the issues that are most likely to arise.
A. Which Works of Art Should Be Protected?
As we have seen, in those states where laws extending some
protection to artists and their works have been enacted, not all
art works meet the criteria set forth in the statutes.3 10 Some en-
tire classes of art are specifically excluded.311 Others are brought
under the law's protection only if they are judged by persons
309. National Film Preservations Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-446, 102 Stat. 1774,
1782 (1988). The Act, part of the Interior Department appropriations bill, established
the National Film Preservation Board. As many as 25 films per year will be placed in the
National Film Registry. If any of these films are colorized, a panel preceding the film will
be required, stating: "Colorized version of original work; certain creative contributors did
not participate." Id.
310. See supra notes 266-307 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 273-277, 290-297 and accompanying text; see also Note, supra
note 14, at 1230.
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expert in such matters to be of good quality.3 12 In some in-
stances, art attached to buildings is included; in others it is
not.31 Such works as films and theatrical productions which are
of necessity collaborative efforts involving the participation of
numbers of people are excluded,314 although a sculptor or
painter would not necessarily forfeit coverage for his works if he
employed a large number of artists in the execution of a large
painting. An untalented writer may invoke the copyright in an
original but otherwise worthless piece of writing. So long as the
writing is his, however dull, uninteresting, or nonsensical it
might be, he may prevent others from reproducing it should
anyone be so foolish as to want to do so.
An individual who bills himself as "the world's fastest art-
ist" paints without brushes, using only palette knives and toilet
paper. Within ten minutes of the moment when he first applies
a dab of paint to a canvas, he completes a painting and frames
it. At the conventions he works, he produces fifty to sixty
framed paintings each day, all the while carrying on amusing
conversations with the crowds that gather to watch his perform-
ance and making change for those who purchase his products. It
would be very difficult indeed to make a convincing case for ex-
tending the protection of the law to such works of "art." The
artist does hold a copyright in his works, so that if, for example,
a purchaser wanted to publish a post card bearing a reproduc-
tion of his painting, one that we will call Purple Sands on the
Rolling Prairie, the artist could enjoin him from doing so and
sue for any damages the artist might have suffered as a result of
such a misappropriation of his property rights in the design im-
printed on the post cards. Suppose, however, that after several
years of looking at Purple Sands on his living room wall, the
purchaser decided to relegate his twenty dollar work of art to
the trash can. Or alternatively, suppose the purchaser's daugh-
ter, now a member of the Art Students' League, asked her father
whether she might use the canvas for one of her own paintings,
312. See supra notes 275-281 and accompanying text; see also Note, supra note 13,
at 1220.
313. See supra notes 225-232, 279 and accompanying text; see also Note, supra note
14, at 1222.
314. See supra notes 177-179 and accompanying text; see also Colby, supra note 177
at 496-497.
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obliterating the scene that had been slapped on it in less than
ten minutes some years before. On what possible ground might
one reasonably claim that the artist should have the right to pre-
vent the owner's disposing of his painting in either of these
ways? Under the French doctrine of droit moral, even the pur-
chaser's granddaughter, after she has inherited Purple Sands,
would be legally bound not to convert the canvas to some pur-
pose she might deem to be more worthwhile than the preserva-
tion of a painting she considers to be utterly worthless. The
owner of Purple Sands has a bundle of rights in the property he
purchased. Of course, he has only those rights that are recog-
nized by the state. But under the conception of property that
has prevailed thus far in the United States, the state should in-
terfere in a possessor's exercise of rights over his property only
for good and sufficient reasons and, then, only if it has compen-
sated him for its interference with his dominion over his prop-
erty.3 15 The state offers no compensation to purchasers of art for
the limitations it imposes upon the exercise of the rights of own-
ership that customarily attach to personal property. Hence, un-
less it can show that some very important public good will be
served by preserving Purple Sands, or some grave harm will be
done by not preserving it, the purchaser should be permitted to
do with it as he will.
Suppose the parishioners of a church commission an artist,
la Crimi,1 6 to create a fresco in their church depicting a bibli-
cal scene, and later find that the scene as rendered by the artist
offends their religious sensibilities. Must they nevertheless live
with the painting or abandon their church without some com-
pensation by the state that imposes such requirements upon
them? No a priori philosophical or legal principle permits the
state to elevate the artist's sensibilities to such an eminence over
those of the people for whom he was presumably working. On
the contrary, there are excellent reasons for concluding that in
such a case, the parishioners should prevail and be permitted to
cover the offending image. Since a fresco cannot be removed
without seriously damaging the structure itself, the artist or the
315. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
316. Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 194 Misc. 570, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1949).
[Vol. 9:1
42http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol9/iss1/1
ARTISTS' RIGHTS
state that wishes to preserve his work should compensate the
church for any damages it suffers.3 17 Failing that, the church
should be permitted to paint over the unsatisfactory fresco and,
if it wishes, retain the services of another artist to create a new
work in the same place. 8 '
Obviously, statutory limitations on coverage of artworks to
those that are somehow judged to be of high quality or merit are
irksome to artists and their defenders. Even more troubling is
the fact that the works of younger artists are less likely to re-
ceive such a coveted designation than are those of artists who
are already well established and enjoy both distinguished repu-
tations and relatively high incomes. Moreover, the established
artist is in a good position to bargain for such rights, if he is
inclined to do so, when he enters into a commission or sales con-
tract, and thus has less need for such a law than does the novice
who has relatively little bargaining power and is happy to sell
his work at almost any price. Such is the price that must be paid
for the sake of both commercial and artistic freedom.
The public does have an interest in the preservation of great
works of art. It has no interest at all in the preservation of
'schlock' work, and if it does, it can jolly well pay for it by
purchasing it from whomever happens to own it. Advocates of
droit moral assert without proof that government should have
the right to protect artists and their works from certain alleged
abuses that might be committed by the persons who buy such
works. This judgment may be based upon the presumption that
all works of art have such great intrinsic value that the public
has or should have a vested interest in their preservation. But
this presumption, which is, after all, a value judgment, is at least
open to doubt and should be supported by something more than
its bare assertion. In the absence of convincing evidence that it
ought to be adopted as a matter of policy, the people who have
invested their resources in works of art should not be prevented
from disposing of them as they please - provided, of course,
that no contractual agreement stipulates that they not do so. On
the other hand, it may be based upon the assumption underlying
the French droit moral, that the artist's personal rights ought to
317. See Note, supra note 14, at 1206-07.
318. Id. at 1224 n.124.
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have priority over the claims of both purchasers of their works
and the public. As a matter of public policy, this assumption
should, at the very least, be examined in the light of its likely
consequences and its practical implications, both for artists and
for those who invest in art. The French droit moral's extreme
deference to the artist's personal rights could lead to rather
anomalous consequences. The artist's right of withdrawal, for
example, has been construed to mean that an artist may with-
draw his work from public scrutiny long after it has been sold, so
long as he indemnifies its owners.3"9 Once the artist has retrieved
his work, however much it may be valued by those who have
possessed it or enjoyed it, he may alter or destroy it if he so
desires.320 In at least one case,32 1 an artist attempted to "with-
draw" a painting by erasing his signature from it when it was
submitted to him for authentication. The court held that if it
was a forgery, he had no right to alter it because it was the prop-
erty of another person; and if it was not a forgery, the artist had
no right to exercise his right of withdrawal after he had sold the
canvas.322 The California statute declares, by way of contrast to
the French droit moral, that one of its principal goals is protec-
tion of the "public interest in preserving the integrity of cultural
and artistic creations, '"' 2 and provides that organizations "act-
ing in the public interest" may have standing to seek injunctive
relief "to preserve or restore the integrity of a work of fine
art. 3
24
Some works of art have attained the status of national
treasures, either because of their great aesthetic merit or be-
cause of historical, religious, or cultural associations. With re-
gard to these items, states may act to limit or prevent their ex-
319. Law of 1957, supra note 6, art. 32, para. 1 provides:
"[T]he author, even after the publication of his work, shall enjoy, in relation to the
transferee, the right to correct or retract. He cannot, however, exercise this right except
on the condition that he indemnify the transferee beforehand for the loss that the cor-
rection or retraction may cause him."
320. See CODE CIVIL [C. civ.] art. 543(32) (82e ed. Petits Codes Dalloz 1983). See
supra note 52 and accompanying text.
321. Sarraute, supra note 7, at 477-78 (discussing In re Vlaminck, Judgment of Apr.
19, 1961, Cour d'Appel, Paris 1961 [G.P.] 2.218).
322. Id.
323. CAL. CIv. CODE § 987(a) (West 1982 & Supp. 1988).
324. Id. § 989(c).
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portation, defacement, or destruction. In doing so, however, they
must inevitably deprive their owners of certain important rights
that ordinarily inhere in items of personal property. To the ex-
tent that the owner's property rights have been abridged, the
state should compensate him in some way for his loss. A sound
analogy may be derived from the policies developed for the com-
pensation of real property owners for limitations imposed upon
them when their buildings are marked for preservation by
landmarks preservation commissions. For example, municipali-
ties in such cases have compensated property owners by confer-
ring upon them the right to transfer air rights to adjacent or
nearby properties. 32 5 These air rights have substantial value. By
making them transferable, the state can reasonably be consid-
ered to have complied with the constitutional requirement that
property not be taken without just compensation,32 assuming,
of course, that the value of the newly transferable right is equal
to the loss in the market value of the structure that has been
placed under the restrictions that accompany landmark
designation.
The creation of a state or federal commission for the preser-
vation of artistic and cultural treasures would make perfectly
good sense. Provided with suitable expert consultants, such a
commission could be responsible for designating those works
found to possess such great aesthetic, cultural, or historical value
as to be worthy of special protection by the government on be-
half of the public. At the same time, however, the commission
should be compelled to compensate the owners of such works for
the interference in their property rights inherent in any such
designation. The owner or his heirs should be entitled, for exam-
ple, to demand that the commission pay the difference between
the market value of the work that might be realized without its
designation (i.e., what it would fetch at an auction at which for-
eign buyers could bid on an equal footing with domestic buyers)
and its value with such a designation (i.e., what might be real-
ized at a sale from which foreign buyers who might intend to
export it would be excluded). Similarly, if the state commission
decided that a particular outdoor sculpture or mural was worthy
325. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
326. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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of preservation and interfered with the property owner's desire
to dismantle the sculpture or paint over the mural, assuming
nothing in the contract between owner and artist prevented the
owner's doing so, the state should compensate the owner for any
diminution in the value of his property as a result of its injunc-
tion against destruction of the artwork and for the interference
itself.
In a sense, the federal and state governments already have
such art preservation commissions. Public museums and private
tax-supported and tax-exempt museums collectively constitute a
vast network of art preservation commissions. Their resources
are dedicated to the collection of those works of art which their
curators and trustees deem worthy of preservation for posterity.
They do this, not by imposing irksome limitations upon the
owners of artworks through legislative or judicial fiat, but by
purchasing items that are offered for sale on the open market.
They are by far the most efficient and the least intrusive institu-
tions dedicated to collecting, displaying, and protecting impor-
tant works of art in the interest of the public and posterity. As
far as possible, preservation in the public interest ought to be
left to them. On the other hand, neither public institutions nor
government should be permitted to become the ultimate official
custodians or the principal patron of the arts or to exercise con-
trol over the private patrons of the arts.
Religious institutions and private individuals have, over the
centuries, commissioned some of the greatest masterpieces.
Their varying tastes and desires have given wide scope to artistic
styles and modes of expression. Where artistic expression is con-
trolled by the state, as it was most notoriously in Nazi Germany
and in the Soviet Union, there is ample evidence that it becomes
cramped and withers. There is no reason to believe that it would
fare any better under the tutelage of art commissions appointed
by democratic governments. Free expression in the arts, like free
expression in politics, science, and the humanities, flourishes
best where there is the least interference by government and the
greatest amount of individual autonomy. Genuine individual au-
tonomy and the diversity to which it gives rise are most likely to
develop fruitfully where maximum support is supplied by pri-
vate persons whose backgrounds and tastes vary. Government
support of artists by way of limitations on the freedom of their
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patrons and customers, however well intentioned, may have the
unintended effect of reducing private support for the arts and
limiting the scope of artistic expression. This is a consequence
which advocates of droit moral seem not to have foreseen, but
one that must be considered to be of the highest significance.
B. What Rights Should Be Protected?
In the 1957 statute, France seems to have assumed that art-
ists are, by and large, like children, incapable of handling their
own business affairs and in need of a paternalistic government's
solicitous concern and protection. Indeed, artists could not be
trusted to write their own contracts. Certain safeguards had to
be written into law that would override provisions to which art-
ists, in their dealings with the public and (presumably) unscru-
pulous agents and dealers, might agree. Which, if any of these
safeguards, ought to be incorporated or recognized in some fash-
ion in American law? Except where children and seriously hand-
icapped persons are concerned, American law tends, in general,
to eschew paternalism and to assume that persons entering into
commercial transactions or contracts for goods or services are
capable of writing the terms of their own agreements. Other ex-
ceptions have been recognized in recent decades, particularly in
consumer transactions, where sellers or manufacturers of prod-
ucts having hidden defects may be held liable in actions in con-
tract or tort for damages suffered by purchasers or third par-
ties.32 7 But contracts between artists and the purchasers of their
works do not bear the most remote resemblance to such transac-
tions. Assuming, then, that artists are, by and large, mature
adults capable of conducting their business affairs with the com-
petence and responsibility that we expect other mature adults to
exercise, which of the extra-contractual protections extended to
artists under droit moral should be recognized in the United
States?
327. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 394-402 (1965) (liability of sellers and
manufacturers); N.Y. U.C.C. LAW §§ 2-313-15 (McKinney 1964 & Supp. 1989).
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1. The Right of Disclosure
No artist in the United States can be compelled to disclose
or publish his work against his will. If he has been commissioned
to execute a work, he can of course be held liable in breach of
contract for whatever damages are sustained by the other party
to the contract, and it goes without saying that he would be
bound, both legally and ethically, to return any advance that he
had received. Authors are notoriously derelict in their duty to
stick to deadlines that they have assumed in their contracts with
publishing houses. Most publishers tend to be rather forgiving in
this regard, partly because they want to maintain their good re-
lations with productive writers on whose works they must de-
pend. But some publishers have become far more demanding of
their writers, and have adopted a policy of demanding both the
rescission of contracts when authors fail to meet their deadlines
and the return of advances in full. Private negotiations between
artists and their patrons and between writers and their publish-
ers appear to work well in this area. No legislation is needed or
warranted.
2. The Right of Paternity
Writers and persons who create works of fine art sometimes
agree, explicitly or implicitly, to create works that will not carry
their own names. In collaborative works, such as films or ghost-
written books, it may be practically impossible for all of the art-
ists involved to be identified as authors of the final work. But
even in those that are not collaborative, the contract between
artist and purchaser may not provide for attribution. A newspa-
per reporter or magazine journalist need not receive a by-line for
each article she writes. Those of us who are television or radio
news junkies might wish that less time would be spent identify-
ing the reporter who reads a thirty-second item, and we may be
thankful that the person who wrote it is not identified as well.
The artist who draws an illustration for a book cover need not
be identified, unless she is successful in persuading the publisher
to give her a credit line or allow her signature to appear on the
cover in some more or less prominent fashion. The demand that
Congress or the states legislate such terms on behalf of artists
and writers, however, is patently absurd. On the other hand,
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writers and artists already have a well-established right to pre-
vent false attribution to them of works that are not their own.
Invoking the torts of privacy and misrepresentation as well as
libel, courts have been reasonably consistent in protecting artists
against false attribution.32 8 Similarly, authors and artists whose
works have been falsely credited to others have won actions that
they have brought under copyright infringement and the princi-
ples of unfair competition, and have been awarded damages for
lost sales and harm to good will and business reputation. A rep-
resentative case is Fisher v. Star Co., 32 9 in which the court held
that the use of the cartoon figures Mutt and Jeff by a competing
cartoonist constituted unfair competition and "an unfair appro-
priation of his [Bud Fisher's] skill and the celebrity acquired by
him in originating, producing and maintaining the characters
and figures so as to continue the demand for further cartoons in
which they appear."33 When the artist's creation is transferred
to another medium, however, he has relatively little reason to
expect that the courts will be sympathetic to his claim that his
work has been mutilated. A novel, for example, that is converted
into a screenplay may undergo a metamorphosis that makes its
author cringe in embarrassment. Theodore Dreiser's claim that
his novel, An American Tragedy, was grossly distorted by Para-
mount Pictures fell on deaf ears when it reached the New York
Supreme Court in 1938.11 However, if the author takes pains to
incorporate into his contract with the studio a provision that re-
quires the studio to guard against excessive editing, distorting,
or mutilation of his work, the courts are more likely to be recep-
tive to his claim that the contract has been breached.
3. The Right of Integrity
In the United States, artists enjoy no right of integrity as
such. However, courts have found that the mutilation of an art
work and subsequent attachment of the artist's name to it or
attribution of the mutilated work to the artist may constitute
328. See Garanz v. Harris, 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952).
329. 231 N.Y. 414, 132 N.E. 133, cert. denied, 257 U.S. 654 (1921).
330. Id. at 433, 132 N.E. at 139.
331. Dreiser v. Paramount Publix Corp., 22 C.O. Bull. (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1938).
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defamation. 32 In Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co.,, 33 the
Second Circuit found that ABC had violated the contract be-
tween BBC and the Monty Python group by editing Monty Py-
thon shows without Monty Python's permission.33 ' Although
BBC had the right to license broadcast of Monty Python shows,
it did not have the right to convey rights that it did not itself
have.3 3 5 This, of course, is purely a question of contract law. But
beyond that, the court held that ABC's actions were inconsistent
with protection afforded the Monty Python group under the
Lanham Act:
whether intended to allow greater economic exploitation of the
work... or to ensure that the copyright proprietor retains a veto
power over revisions desired for the derivative work, the ability of
the copyright holder to control his work remains paramount in
our copyright law .... [U]nauthorized editing of the underlying
work . . . would constitute an infringement of the copyright in
that work similar to any other use of a work that exceeded the
license granted by the proprietor of the copyright.1
31
At the same time, the court noted:
American copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize
moral rights or provide a cause of action for their violation, since
the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than the personal,
rights of authors .... Thus courts have long granted relief for
misrepresentation of an artist's work by relying on theories
outside the statutory law of copyright, such as contract law ... or
the tort of unfair competition.337
In the United States, with the possible exception of Califor-
nia, Buffet would not have won his case against the owner of the
dismantled refrigerator. 338 It is easy to sympathize with the art-
ist's sense that his artistic integrity has been compromised by
332. Clevenger v. Baker Voorhis & Co., 8 N.Y.2d 187, 190-91, 168 N.E.2d 643, 645,
203 N.Y.S.2d 812, 815 (1960) (citing Ben-Oliel v. Press Pub. Co., 251 N.Y. 250, 256, 167
N.E. 432, 434 (1929)).
333. Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976). See also
supra notes 233-248 and accompanying text.
334. Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 14.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 21.
337. Id. at 24.
338. See supra notes 92-97 and accompanying text.
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the deliberate dismantling of a work that he considered to be an
integral whole. But why should the refrigerator's owner have
been prevented from doing what he pleased with his property,
unless he had agreed, before Buffet decorated it with his paint-
ing, to keep it intact? It was, after all, his refrigerator. If a con-
temporary Buffet agreed to paint a scene on a student's van,
would the student, in the absence of some prior agreement, be
enjoined forever against dismantling his van, or selling it to an-
other party who might want to use its parts on other vehicles?
Under Buffet, that would presumably be the result. Such restric-
tions on property owners, in the absence of prior agreement by
the parties, are unconscionable. We fully understand and sym-
pathize with the artist's dismay at cavalier abuse of his work.
But when he parts with it, unless he has exacted specific con-
tractual conditions to the contrary, he should anticipate that
that might be the result. Much the same may be said of some of
the other cases falling under the integrity principle.
In France, Sudre was awarded damages for the destruction
of his sculpture, which the townspeople evidently felt served a
more valuable purpose as pothole filler. 39 Without passing on
Sudre's skill as a sculptor, we must point out the obvious fact
that the people who commissioned the work paid for it and
Sudre was compensated for his efforts. Inasmuch as it was a
public work, designed to be in a public place, the interests of the
people who lived in the community and would have had to pass
by Sudre's sculpture every day were entitled to at least as much
deference as those of the artist. It is utterly perverse to empower
the artist to exercise a unilateral veto over such a public monu-
ment, while the desires of the people who live in the community
count for nothing once the artist has expressed himself. If a stat-
ute provided such protection to the artist's work, it would be
presumed that the purchaser knew, when he purchased the work
or (in the Buffet type of case) permitted the artist to decorate
his property, that he had consented to certain limitations upon
the rights and powers he would thereafter enjoy on the use of his
property. Where a statute embodying droit moral exists, such a
presumption might properly be made with regard to professional
art dealers and informed collectors; but the average purchaser of
339. See supra notes 102-107 and accompanying text.
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a work of art could not realistically be expected to be familiar
with the statutory limitations that would be attached to his
purchase, much less to have given his voluntary consent to them.
In any event, there is no rational justification for imposing such
paternalistic measures upon the art buying public or, for that
matter, on artists, who are generally quite capable of bargaining
for themselves. When their work is of high quality, it is likely to
fetch high prices in the open market. As demand for an artist's
work rises, so does his bargaining power. If he feels that he
needs benefits or rights over and above the purely financial re-
wards he receives for his work, he may write a contract or have a
competent art lawyer write one, incorporating the provisions he
wants. Such a contract would enable the purchaser to know pre-
cisely what burdens he accepts when he purchases a given work
of art and would give both buyer and seller far greater flexibility
than either would have under the mandatory, inalienable pre-
scriptions of the excessively paternalistic dictates of the French
droit moral.
4. The Right of Withdrawal or Modification
No statute in the United States provides for a right of with-
drawal or modification and, as we have seen, even in France,
where such rights are recognized, the artist who exercises them
is under a heavy burden to compensate the owner of the work in
question. " ° Nor is it clear what the artist must pay if he does
choose to exercise his right of withdrawal or modification. 4
Must he reimburse the owner for the purchase price of the work,
or pay him the market value of the work at the time of the with-
drawal or modification? It would be manifestly unfair to give the
artist the right to withdraw or modify a work by payment of the
original purchase price if that work has appreciated in value.
The temptation to withdraw or modify such works in order to
resell them at higher prices would simply be too great. Even if
the original purchaser were given the option of first refusal, the
successful artist might be tempted to withdraw and hold her
older works off the market in order to let them appreciate still
340. See supra notes 64-70, 320 and accompanying text.
341. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
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further before putting them up for sale again. In the meantime,
the original purchaser would be deprived of the aesthetic pleas-
ure he might otherwise have enjoyed from the work and any fi-
nancial rewards that he might have derived from his investment.
Moreover, it is not clear what the original purchaser's rights
might be, even if he has the right of first refusal. Does he have
the right to repurchase the work at the price he received from
the artist when the right of withdrawal or modification was exer-
cised, despite any appreciation in value in the meantime? If so,
it is unlikely that the artist would be eager to let it go at such a
low price relative to market value. If, on the other hand, the art-
ist could demand of the original owner the current market value,
artists would be tempted to withdraw or modify their works
whenever they believed the market was bullish and, if successful,
enjoy profits based purely upon such speculative maneuvers. In
the meantime, the early purchasers of their works would be put
at a great disadvantage - one that strikes us as being morally
obtuse."
A statute conferring such rights upon artists would render
meaningless contracts for the sale of works of art. Such contracts
would be converted from contracts of sale into loans callable at
the will of the artist. We see no justification whatever for enact-
ing legislation that would confer such rights upon artists. If an
artist is convinced that such a provision is essential for his peace
of mind and his sense of artistic integrity, let him bargain for it.
Works of art are no longer viewed, if they ever were, as objects
created for purely aesthetic purposes. They are obviously re-
garded, both by artists and by art collectors, as investments.
They have financial value, sometimes so great as to reach aston-
ishing heights. It may seem crass to suggest that they be treated,
at least in some respects, like other investment vehicles, but that
is precisely how we suggest they be viewed. A statute that pro-
vides for the artist's right to withdraw his artistic creations has,
in a sense, created a call option on every work of art and vested
342. We have taken note of the provisions in some European codes conferring upon
artists the right to be paid a certain percentage of sums realized upon subsequent sales
of their works. We are not in principle opposed to such provisions, although we would
prefer to see them incorporated into contracts rather than have them imposed by stat-
ute. However, in view of the fact that markets go down as well as up, we would suggest
that in equity, artists should share in any losses from subsequent sales as well.
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those options in the works' creators. When a corporation issues
new debt instruments, it may, for sound financial reasons, want
to reserve a right to call them. The rights of both the issuer and
the purchaser are clearly spelled out in the prospectus and on
the face of the instrument itself. Thus, any purchaser of a call-
able debenture has ample notice of the precise conditions under
which his investment may be called away from him, and in par-
ticular, what he will receive in exchange for the investment he is
asked to make. The purchaser of a work of art is entitled to no
less. An artist may argue that because some aspect of his person-
ality is invested in the work he has created, he ought to be enti-
tled to withdraw it or modify it if he determines at some later
date that it no longer represents the best that he is capable of
doing. But we see no significant difference between this argu-
ment and a parallel argument that an entrepreneur might make
to the effect that he has invested not only his time and money
but also some important part of himself in his business, and that
he ought therefore to be entitled to call the debentures he has
written whenever he concludes that to do so would be in the best
interests of his business and of his self esteem. A publisher who
has invested tens of thousands of dollars in editing a writer's
manuscript and setting it in type in order to make it ready for
publication should not be required by law to permit the author
to withdraw his manuscript, unless the author is prepared to
compensate the publisher for all of his expenses. Even then, per-
haps, the publisher may be entitled to refuse to comply with the
author's wishes. There must come a time in every business
transaction when the parties are deemed to have come to a
meeting of the minds, the transaction is completed, and in the
absence of any further agreement by them, neither party may be
permitted to renege on the terms of the agreement. Similarly, a
collector or investor who has purchased a painting should not be
compelled to relinquish possession of it because an artist's tem-
perament leads him to conclude that his artistic standards re-
quire him to withdraw the work from public display.
VI. Conclusion
The concept of moral rights developed in France and
adopted, in varying degrees, by other European states, was
founded upon an appreciation of the importance of art and art-
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ists that transcends the purely commercial attitudes that inform
the international art markets today. Artists, musicians, sculp-
tors, and writers all make valuable contributions to each of us,
enhancing our enjoyment of life and conveying to us their inner-
most thoughts and experiences, opening to us the delicate nu-
ances of their perceptions of nature, of humanity, and of the
world of the spirit. Their works beautify our cities and render
our own lives more meaningful in countless ways. The works of
some artists, ancient and contemporary, are rightly recognized
as masterpieces and as national treasures. Such works deserve to
be protected and preserved so that future generations too may
enjoy them, learn from them, and be inspired by them. We do
not pretend to be art critics, and do not presume to distinguish
between those works that deserve to be called national treasures
and those that do not. But if we pay heed to those who are gen-
erally recognized as experts in the field, we must conclude, as
common sense would suggest, that some works are not master-
pieces and are unworthy of any special protection.
We conclude that if a sculpture or a painting causes discom-
fort and anguish to those who have commissioned it or who have
to live with it, then that work may be removed or, if it can be
removed in no other way, it may be destroyed for the sake of the
people who would otherwise have had to live with it, despite the
hurt that such action must occasion to the artist who invested
his very being in it. The state has no right, in the name of pro-
tecting the artist's personality rights, to impose upon unwilling
viewers works of art that are deemed by them to be hideous or
distasteful. If the artist feels that he must have the right to pre-
vent his work from being mutilated, he may demand, if he can,
that such a provision be included in the contract of sale or the
commission. Thus, we favor no statutory protection of such a
right, though we recognize that some valuable works of art might
suffer damage or destruction by their owners as others have in
the past. This risk is one of the prices we pay for not living in a
paternalistic society that protects us from our own folly.
A corollary of the principle of individual liberty is the prin-
ciple that the state not protect people from their own lack of
good taste, their incompetence, their avarice, or their other
vices. Citizens in a free society may have the most abominable
taste. Respect for their autonomy requires respect for their right
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to purchase bad art as well as good, to install it in places they
control, and to display it tastelessly. If they choose to do so, they
may allow it to deteriorate and decay, or they may deliberately
mutilate it, thinking that by doing so they are improving it. Un-
like museums and libraries, which serve the public and posterity
in a fiduciary capacity, the private owners of art and books have
no public trust to fulfill and no public constituency to which
they are answerable. We may abhor their bad taste and con-
demn their bad practices, but the imposition of public obliga-
tions upon them in the interest of preserving artists' alleged
rights is incompatible with the ideas of freedom to contract, the
free marketplace, and individual autonomy which are more pre-
cious by far than the sensibilities of any artist or the most valua-
ble work of art ever produced.
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